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“ile-aux-Noix,” “Niagara falls.” He will not yield to the people of the United States the title “American,” and hence we have “United States” used incessantly throughout his book as an adjective. Mr. Kingsford may as well give up a hopeless contest. Words, once current, have a silent obstinacy that cannot be overcome.

There are numerous misprints, especially in connection with foreign words, and some small mistakes when European affairs are referred to. It was the Convention not the National Assembly which sat in France in 1794 (p. 5); Austerlitz was won not on November but on December 2; the Treaty of Pressburg was made not on January but on December 26; the Berlin Decree was issued not on November 25 but on November 21; Auerstadt should be Auerstädt (p. 23). The crew of the “Macedonian” is said on the same page to have been both 303 and 292 (p. 401). A period of thirty-nine years is called “upwards of a quarter of a century” (p. 429). One is puzzled to know how quotation by Sir G. C. Lewis can add importance to a passage from Scott (p. 25), and why notes referring to the Canadian Archives are sometimes within brackets and sometimes not.

GEORGE W. WRONG.

John Sherman's Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate, and Cabinet. An Autobiography. (Chicago, New York, London, Berlin: The Werner Company. 1895. Two vols., pp. xxxv, 1239.)

THESE volumes are no exception, in mechanical form, to those usually issued by “subscription” publishers. They are bulky and inconvenient for handling. The same printed matter, in clear but somewhat smaller type, might have been included in two volumes of moderate size which could be read without putting one’s wrists to a strain. They are paged continuously, the second one beginning with page 603.

The title “Recollections” is somewhat misapplied. A large part of the space is given to extracts from speeches, which, though of permanent value, should have been assigned to separate volumes. Their inclusion here breaks the narrative and involves a repetition of the same facts and arguments, which sometimes wearies the reader and is calculated to obstruct the general use of the book.

The author and subject of the two volumes came of the best New England stock,—the Shermans of Connecticut, from a branch transplanted to Ohio at the beginning of this century when the American empire was crossing the Alleghanies. In public service, military and civil, the brothers, William Tecumseh and John, surpass any who have borne that honored name. There is nothing obscure or humble in their origin; their father was a lawyer and judge in Ohio as his father had been in Connecticut. Their mother was the daughter of a prosperous merchant of Norwalk, Conn., and was well taught in the seminary at Poughkeepsie, N.Y. They were two of eleven children, William being the sixth and John the eighth.

Their father died when they were of very tender years ; but brothers and sisters were helpful to each other, and were, besides, assisted by other kindred in good circumstances. Lancaster and Mansfield are the two well-known towns of Ohio with which they became most identified.

The boy John, left much to himself, missed the complete training which was at his command. He went so far as to become fairly proficient in algebra and geometry, and obtained a certain facility in reading Latin, without pushing on to liberal studies and the modern languages. His twofold desire to help his mother and to gain a fortune for himself turned him away from college doors. He would not have begun life like most Western boys of that day if he had not gone down the river in a flat-boat laden with merchandise. His trip on the Ohio to Cincinnati proved to be a losing venture ; but his thrift saved him afterwards from similar disasters. He was, while still a boy, a surveyor and engineer, an excellent practical training which recalls a like experience in the early life of Washington and Lincoln. He became, at the age of sixteen, antipathetic to the Democratic party, whose success at a state election deprived him of his place. Later he turned to legal studies, being admitted to the bar as soon as he was twenty-one, after having already been engaged in practice for a year or two. In three years after his admission he had accumulated \$10,000 in his profession and had made profits also in the manufacture of doors, blinds, and other building materials. At the bar, as afterwards in the political forum, he showed his intellectual traits,—a clear and vigorous intellect, logical power of the first order, and a determination to go to the bottom of every subject he dealt with. From the first he cared little for and almost despised the adornments of rhetoric. No less a contemporary than Chase once advised him to add a peroration to a speech, but after giving some thought to the suggestion he put it aside. He has, however, the gift of genuine eloquence, as is shown by his address, July 7, 1893, on the arrival of the Spanish caravels at Chicago.

The author has revealed himself, his hopes, ambitions, and youthful missteps with almost Franklin's candor ; and it was quite unnecessary for him to disclaim egotism and pride of family in narrating what the public most wish to know. The chief interest of the volumes centres, of course, in the political transactions in which Mr. Sherman has borne a part. His public life began with his election to Congress in 1854, and has continued without interruption to this day. It is contemporaneous with the entire existence of the Republican party, in which he took at the beginning a leading position, and of which he is now altogether the foremost figure. Though a Republican, never questioning or hesitating in his allegiance, he had no earlier connection with the antislavery movement, and had no sympathy with its aims and spirit. On that roll of Ohioans where are found the names of Thomas Morris, Salmon P. Chase, Joshua R. Giddings, and Samuel Lewis, that of Sherman has no place. It sounds strangely that the most distinguished Republican of to-day was an earnest supporter of the Compromise of 1850 and of the Fugitive Slave Act, was a steadfast oppo-

nent of Free-soilers, and defended the maintenance of slavery in the District of Columbia. Even when the Fugitive Slave Act was finally repealed in 1864, he withheld his vote because the repeal did not save the act of 1793. No mention is made of his association with Giddings, whom Lowell thought worthy of an ode, although they were colleagues for four years. Nevertheless he has always been so faithful a party man that he acquiesced readily in the support of Republican measures against slavery, although he might not have promoted them in advance. He came at once to the front as a member of the Congress meeting in December, 1855, in which after a long contest Banks was elected Speaker, and thus he took a part in the first Republican triumph. He served as a member, and the most effective member, of the committee appointed to visit Kansas and report concerning the contests between the pro-slavery and Free State forces in that territory. That duty well performed, he became the leader of his party in the House and its candidate for Speaker in the next Congress.

In deportment as senator or member of the House, Mr. Sherman leaves nothing to be desired. He has been uniformly amiable, has dealt fairly with opponents, and, though generally in the thick of the fight, has never, no matter what the provocation, uttered a word which his best friend could wish he had left unsaid. The writer, in pursuing a certain study, was obliged to go closely over the debates of Mr. Sherman's first fourteen years in the Senate and was struck with his exceptional adherence to the highest standard of parliamentary decorum. It is doubtful if any other public man in our history, to whom has been assigned the post of aggressive leadership in hot political controversy, could stand the same scrutiny.

With all the poise and strength of his understanding and his general fidelity to right conduct, one misses in Mr. Sherman something which it is not easy to define,—perhaps a certain want of ideality or of political imagination, or of appreciation of moral forces, qualities more or less conspicuous in Jefferson, in the two Adamses, and in Lincoln. Judged by what he leaves unsaid, he would not, as President in 1862, and perhaps at any time, have issued the Proclamation of Emancipation (pp. 313, 330).

This defect or limitation, in connection with his intense partisanship, which he confesses to have been his fault (p. 227), takes from Mr. Sherman's career something of the picturesqueness which otherwise it would have. One searches it in vain for scenes like these : Adams maintaining the right of petition in face of a frowning oligarchy ; Giddings censured for his defence of freedom and returning to his seat with the approbation of his people ; John P. Hale bidding defiance to his party in resisting the annexation of Texas ; Corwin denouncing the invasion of Mexico ; Douglas taking his stand against the Lecompton Constitution, though it was backed by the support and patronage of a Democratic President ; Sumner putting his foot on the San Domingo scheme and awaiting the penalty imposed by a subservient Senate ; Chatham thanking God that the American Colonies had resisted British aggression ; John Bright confronting popular frenzy in the Crimean War and forced from the public service by his Manchester constitu-

ency, or Abdiel-like resigning from Gladstone's cabinet when he could not in conscience sanction the bombardment of Alexandria. Such instances of courageous self-reliance make the romance of political biography. They give to statesmen an immortality, sometimes in a day, which would not come from a life-long conformity. If in a recent exigency an old senator, standing at the head of the Committee on Foreign Relations, where Sumner had once stood, had, with that example before him, put his foot on a resolution which meant war if it had any honest meaning whatever, demanding at least the customary pause for deliberation, the name of Sherman might have been added to the honored list of statesmen who have held at bay the madness of the hour, assured of vindication by the permanent judgment of mankind.

Mr. Sherman's connection with financial discussions began May 27, 1858, when he made a speech on the expenditures of the government, and has continued to this time. At an early period he was too much affected by local atmosphere,—the "Ohio idea" then running madly among his constituents,—or by what seemed to him political and financial necessities. In a speech February 27, 1868, he affirmed the right of the government to redeem the principal of the national debt in existing depreciated currency, a position taken, as he afterwards explained, to induce holders of bonds to exchange them for those bearing a lower rate of interest and payable in coin. This declaration alarmed bondholders here and abroad, induced an anxious inquiry from John Bright, and brought out a pamphlet from Edward Atkinson, entitled *Sherman's Fallacies*. It is creditable to Mr. Sherman that he now disapproves the position that he then took (pp. 439, 624).

The necessity of retiring the national notes wholly or in part, in order to resume and maintain specie payments, or to keep up the gold standard, has never been admitted by Mr. Sherman. He even advised, as a member of Hayes's Cabinet, against the latter's veto of the inflation bill, and he has held to the position that three hundred millions or more of these notes are essential to a sound currency. He discredits altogether "the endless chain" of coming and departing greenbacks, reducing at each visit the gold reserve of the treasury. Conservative financiers will agree rather with McCulloch, Hayes, and Cleveland, than with him; but this is not the place to enter upon that discussion.

Mr. Sherman disclaims the paternity of the "Sherman Silver Law," which carried up the silver issue to 4,500,000 ounces a month (pp. 1061, 1068-1070, 1144, 1162, 1163, 1175); but under the circumstances the title is not a misnomer. It is safe to say that it would not have passed without his effective aid; and he was chairman of the conference committee which framed and reported it. His explanation of his connection with the measure is hardly satisfactory. An act, which he says he was willing to repeal the day of its passage, was one which he should not have assisted in passing. It was his want of faith and courage which brought about the curious spectacle witnessed at the beginning of the next administration, when Republicans were beseeching a Democratic President

and Congress to undo the work they had themselves done. The only apology for supporting the bill which Mr. Sherman gives is that it was necessary to prevent free-coinage legislation. But such legislation was impossible against an executive veto; and while Mr. Sherman implies distrust of President Harrison, he gives no evidence of an announcement from him that he would sign a free-silver bill (pp. 1070, 1175, 1189). In the absence of such an announcement it was for Mr. Sherman to assume that he would do his duty in resisting the free-silver craze, as Grant, Hayes, and Cleveland did theirs, under like circumstances. Mr. Sherman says he "had no right to throw the responsibility upon him [the President]." But upon what principle is the highest magistrate in the land to be relieved of the responsibility which the Constitution distinctly places upon him? What is the veto power good for if it is to be put aside in that way? It should be added that Mr. McKinley, the manager of the measure in the House, took at the time a view of the situation entirely different from that which Mr. Sherman now gives. In his speech, June 7, 1890, he maintained that the bill was the most favorable to the silver party that was then attainable, and that its defeat would be the defeat of all silver legislation at that session.

But whatever criticisms certain points in Mr. Sherman's connection with our financial history may invite, it is due to him to put on record that in the Senate and the Cabinet and on the platform, he has done a service to his country in the restoration and maintenance of specie payments, and in resistance to schemes of silver inflation, far surpassing that of any contemporary statesman. It is no exaggeration which associates him with Hamilton and Chase. He reported in the session of 1874-1875, and carried through the Senate the resumption bill. It passed the House, though voted against on the ground that it was inadequate for its purpose by conservative men like Dawes, Hawley, E. R. Hoar, G. F. Hoar, H. L. Pierce, and others from the Eastern States. But in spite of these honest doubts and fears Mr. Sherman, as Secretary of the Treasury, put in execution the scheme which he had initiated and promoted in Congress. Nor did his achievement end here, though this alone was enough to secure his permanent fame. No public man in our history has done so much to expose in Congress, and before the people, the fallacies of the advocates of paper money inflation and of a silver standard. Others have made sporadic efforts, but his service has been constant. There is no county in his own state where he has not been heard, often more than once, on this subject; and he has taken the foremost part for twenty years in the Senate in every debate on the currency. It is due to him, far more than to any other voice and influence, that the wave of silver fanaticism has receded from his own and other states of the Mississippi Valley.

Mr. Sherman disavows ever having been "an extreme protectionist" (p. 1008). His judgment is in favor, "on the whole," of the McKinley tariff, though disapproving some of its details. He recognizes the perpetual disturbance to business consequent upon the political contests over the tariff, resulting in an act passed by a bare majority, shortly repealed by a close

vote to give place to another, the repeal of the repealing act at once agitated, and so on indefinitely,—all to the dismay of manufacturers and merchants, who can count on nothing as stable beyond the terms of the President and Congress holding office for the time being. Mr. Sherman objects to this endless alternation, and believes that the tariff should no longer be “the football of partisan legislation,” but that it should be “a purely business and not a political or sectional issue;” and that the framing of its schedules should be intrusted to “the selected representatives of the commercial, industrial, farming, and laboring classes.” He confesses the selfishness of the makers of tariffs, who sacrifice their professed principles when contending for the interests of their own states and “deestricts” (pp. 189, 193, 843, 1084, 1085, 1128, 1135).

It is interesting to note what charitable judgments of antagonists are habitual with statesmen as they come near to the end of all controversy. Mr. Blaine said to the writer a few months before his death, in reference to his *Twenty Years of Congress*: “What I have said of Bayard and Schurz is true, but I wish it were not there.” With the exception of these two, Mr. Blaine praised friends, adversaries, and rivals alike. His personal descriptions are of such a metallic and stereotyped form that they fail to individualize the long procession of contemporaries whom he brings before his readers. Mr. Sherman’s tributes are heartier and less conventional. He has kindly words for his Democratic colleagues in the Senate, Pendleton, Thurman, and Payne, and for other Democratic opponents, as Governor Hoadley, Governor Campbell, S. S. Cox, and Henry Watterson. To President Cleveland he is uniformly fair, commanding him as “a positive force in sustaining all measures in support of the public credit” (pp. 1195, 1208). He sees in Buchanan only “feebleness of will, not intentional wrong,” pays a tribute to his frankness and sincerity, and relates an interview with the ex-President at his home when he gave an emphatic approval to Mr. Lincoln’s measures for the suppression of the rebellion (pp. 202, 249, 250). His mantle of charity covers even President Pierce (p. 143), whose baleful letter to Jefferson Davis, January 6, 1860, he may have overlooked. While uniformly just to his political allies, Mr. Sherman does not carry his charity so far as to shield Roscoe Conkling, whose “insane hate” and “inborn desire to domineer” led him to the attempt to wreck the administrations of Hayes and Garfield (pp. 682, 684, 817). It would have been well if Sherman, Edmunds, and other senators had not at an earlier day, by letting him have his way, stimulated this Cæsar with the meat on which he fed, making him grow so great. To President Hayes Mr. Sherman pays a just tribute, placing him before Garfield, whose weakness of will was a fatal element of his character (pp. 807, 822). It is to Mr. Sherman’s credit that, while not a leader in the civil service reform, he took exception at the time to Garfield’s thrust at that reform, which was placed in his letter of acceptance in order to propitiate Conkling (p. 779). He now advises a mandatory provision forbidding members of Congress to recommend appointments (p. 855).

Mr. Sherman is not an admirer of General Grant's civil career. He regretted at the outset that the latter was made a candidate for the Presidency, then preferring Chase ; and he mentions the General's disposition to treat heads of departments as military subordinates, and his indifference to financial questions (pp. 416, 447, 449, 474, 475, 552, 788).

The value of these volumes is chiefly in their relation to financial history. There is elsewhere a want of fulness and clearness of statement even as to events in which the author took part, a want of research where his knowledge is only at second hand, and a passing over of important transactions on which he might have thrown light. One looks in vain to find an explanation of the methods by which the necessary Democratic votes were obtained for the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, or to find an account of the negotiations with Southern members of Congress which resulted in their acquiescence in the decision of the Electoral Commission,—matters on which Mr. Sherman, and two public men of his state, Mr. Ashley and Governor Foster, might give information.

Mr. Sherman puts on record his opinion that early in 1861 the public mind of the North was so decidedly in favor of concessions to the South that "the Republicans would have acquiesced in the Crittenden Compromise or in any measure approved by Lincoln and Seward." It is not doing justice to Mr. Lincoln, who maintained the right and duty of the Republicans to carry on the government on the principles which they had proclaimed, to couple his name with that of Seward, who seemed at the time equal to any surrender. It is going beyond the evidence to say that the Republicans would have acquiesced in the Crittenden Compromise. Senator Clark's resolution that the Constitution "needs to be obeyed rather than amended" expressed then the judgment of Republican senators ; and Seward's private letters show that he was unable to influence his associates. He wrote, January 13, 1861 : "Two-thirds of the Republican senators are as reckless in action as the South." It is safe to say that the adoption of the Crittenden Compromise in 1861, under the lead of Seward or any one else, would have divided hopelessly the Republican masses, left Mr. Lincoln without a party behind him, and brought again the Democrats into power.

Mr. Sherman says of the provision of the reconstruction act of 1867, which first established compulsory suffrage for the colored people : "On the 16th of February, after consultation with my political colleagues, I moved a substitute for the House bill" (p. 370) ; and this is all the account he gives of it before it reached the Senate. But the fact is, as appears by accounts written out by Sumner and Conness and by Mr. Sherman's remarks in the Senate February 10, 1870, there was a formal canvass of Republican senators February 16, 1867, which appointed a committee of seven, with Mr. Sherman as chairman. In this committee Sumner moved the provision for equal suffrage ; but the motion received, besides his own, only one other vote, probably Howard's. He then gave notice that he should appeal to the caucus, in which, on Wilson's motion, it was adopted by one or two majority. Mr. Sherman, though not favoring it before, now reported and

sustained it as the decision of the party. Mr. Sherman's mere reference to "a consultation" is hardly an adequate explanation of an important historical circumstance, which led to the Fifteenth Amendment. Mr. Sherman questions the wisdom and expediency of this last constitutional provision (p. 450), coming after experience to the same conclusion as Mr. Blaine, who, in the interview already referred to, said with dramatic emphasis: "I believe it would have been better to have stopped with the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true, what Burke said, you cannot indict a whole people. You cannot make the Southern people do what they determine they will not do, though you should put a soldier on every square foot of ground."

Mr. Sherman reviews at some length the impeachment proceedings against Andrew Johnson, coming to the rather lame conclusion that he voted "guilty," but "was entirely satisfied with the result of the vote, brought about by the action of several Republican senators" (p. 432). He is of opinion that the President violated the "Tenure of Office Act"; but that was at least a doubtful question,—Chase, Fessenden, and Trumbull taking the view that he had not gone beyond the law. The mere violation of a statute, if there had been one, would not have been a justification for the proceeding; for such breaches were committed several times by Lincoln and once at least by Grant. Mr. Blaine, though voting to impeach, has recorded his mature judgment that Johnson was "impeached for one series of misdemeanors and tried for another series"; and that the proceeding was "not justifiable on the charges made"; and this is the view that now prevails. Republican orators and writers have never counted the measure among the party's achievements.

Mr. Sherman's account (pp. 470-473) of the differences between Senator Sumner and President Grant and Secretary Fish is singularly inaccurate and confused, because of imperfect recollection and inadequate research. Indeed, he declares that "by the happening of great events this incident has almost passed out of memory." Mr. Sumner and Mr. Fish had not "differed widely in respect to the annexation of San Domingo and certain diplomatic appointments and former treaties, among them the highly important English negotiation for the settlement of claims growing out of the war." They agreed as to the annexation of San Domingo, both being unfriendly to it, as General J. B. Cox's paper in the *Atlantic Monthly* for August, 1895, shows, though Mr. Fish finally yielded his better judgment to the President's pressure. They also had no differences as to diplomatic appointments. They had no substantial differences on the question of claims against England and the British proclamation of belligerency,—the senator approving Mr. Fish's instructions to Motley in May, 1869, and particularly those which followed in September. Mr. Sherman says, without taking dates into account, that this difference which he supposes to have existed led to Motley's removal. That removal did not take place till July 1, 1870, eight months at least after Mr. Motley's connection with the negotiations had ceased, by their transfer to Washington as the better

forum ; and it took place at a time when no negotiations were pending. When revived, they were revived at Washington in December, 1870, the American minister at London taking no part. Motley's removal came July 1, 1870, the day after the defeat of the San Domingo treaty, and was the President's answer to the Senate's action, for which he held Sumner responsible.

Mr. Sherman says that the President, when he called on Sumner, was "evidently misled" as to the latter's views concerning the San Domingo treaty. It is doing injustice to the President's intelligence to assume that when a senator told him he would give a candid consideration to a subject then first brought to his attention, he thereby pledged himself to a course of action on a treaty as to which he was as yet wholly uninformed. That has not been Mr. Sherman's way of dealing with suitors, nor is it the way of any public man who has a proper appreciation of his place and duties.

Mr. Sherman refers to Sumner's "extreme and active opposition to the treaty" and the severity with which he arraigned the parties concerned in it. It is true that he spoke plainly of the action of Babcock and the naval officers as they came to his knowledge, but his language concerning the President, while the treaty was under consideration, was in every respect considerate and kindly. Such was the testimony of the President's friend, Senator Howe. The President's retaliatory act in the removal of Motley brought about a change of relations.

Mr. Sherman states that he did not vote for the treaty, as did a large majority of the Republican senators, but he does not state whether he voted at all or not. The fact is that he did not vote ; and in view of his recorded opinions against insular and other acquisitions it would have been interesting to have had his explanation of the withholding of his vote. Was it the fear, which is likely to have governed Wilson's affirmative vote, that the crossing of the President's will at that early stage of his administration might place another name by the side of those of Tyler and Johnson?

Mr. Sherman has profitably employed his vacations in instructive journeys, often visiting the Pacific coast and remote West, and refreshing himself now and then with crossing the Atlantic. Among his remembered experiences in Paris was a presentation to the Emperor and taking part in the Mayor's reception at the Palais Royal, where the American senator appeared in a costume which would have startled his Richland County neighbors, "a dress coat and trousers extending to the knees, and below black silk stockings and pumps." At Berlin he had an interview with Bismarck. In England he met Gladstone and Disraeli and also our country's steadfast friend, of whom he says : "Of all the men I met in London, Mr. Bright impressed me most favorably. Finely formed physically, he was also mentally strong. He was frank and free in his talk and had none of the hesitation or reserve common with Englishmen. He was familiar with our war and had no timidity in the expression of his sympathy for the Union cause. If we ever erect a monument to an Englishman, it

should be to John Bright" (p. 399). It sounds strangely after this tribute, to relate that on April 2, 1889, when a resolution commemorative of John Bright, who had just died, was offered in the Senate, it was Mr. Sherman who prevented its immediate passage by insisting on its reference to his committee, whence it never emerged. It is not known what prompted this opposition to a recognition of our country's benefactor, its greatest foreign benefactor after Lafayette. Was it undue deference to foreign agitators on our soil, seeking to embroil our people in their old-world controversies?

Mr. Sherman's farewell words,—that while doing hereafter his best "to add to the strength and prosperity of the United States," he will do "nothing to extend its limits or to add new dangers by acquisition of foreign territory,"—together with other passages concerning "outside possessions" (pp. 975, 1039, 1040), give assurance that while he remains in the Senate we are to be saved from the incorporation of Samoa, St. Thomas, San Domingo, Cuba, and the Sandwich Islands into our American system, and that this nation is to be confined to its legitimate sphere of development within its own present ample domains. Sober-minded patriots bid the veteran statesman God-speed in this service.

EDWARD L. PIERCE.

Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Historical and Juridical; with Observations upon the Ordinary Provisions of State Constitutions, and a Comparison with the Constitutions of Other Countries. By ROGER FOSTER. Vol. I. (Boston: The Boston Book Company. 1895. Pp. viii, 713.)

THE line between commentaries on a constitution on the one hand, and a constitutional history on the other, is not always very clearly drawn. Perhaps we may say that the primary purpose of the first is legal exposition of things as they are, while that of the second is to explain how things came to be what they are. The difference is in the point of view. Story's *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States*, and Stubbs's *Constitutional History of England*, may be taken as types of the two methods—the one a text-book for lawyers, the other for scholars.

But while the difference may be roughly marked in this way, after all the two kinds of thing are necessarily more or less merged. The commentator cannot expound without tracing more or less of historic sequences. The historian fails if his researches do not lead to a lucid exposition of existing institutions. Indeed, the present tendency of historical and legal scholarship is toward a distinct blending of method. It is not too much to claim that the richest results in political science may in no other way so well be reached as by using the processes of historical research. In other words, political science is not merely law. It is not merely history. It is both. Law is its subject-matter. History is its method of treatment. Law is best illumined by the clear light of history.

No better illustration of the truth of this thesis can easily be found than